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Boredom proneness is commonly assessed
and measured using self-report scales and
questionnaires. The only full-scale mea-
sure of boredom that has been extensively
used to assess boredom proneness is the
Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS) (Farmer
and Sundberg, 1986). BPS takes boredom
proneness to be the tendency to experi-
ence boredom in a wide range of situations
(Farmer and Sundberg, 1986). Although
there is a close semantic relationship
between the terms “tendency” and “dis-
position,” boredom proneness should not
be understood as a dispositional state or
property. A subject can possess the dis-
position to  even if the subject never
actually s. For that reason, I wish to sug-
gest that one is prone to boredom not only
if one possesses characteristics that make
one susceptible to being bored, but also
if one frequently experiences boredom 1.
Unlike a disposition that can remain hid-
den or non-actualized, boredom prone-
ness, I hold, has visible and significant
for the subject manifestations. Indeed, the
frequent experience of boredom forms
1In Fahlman et al. (2013), a disjunctive account
of boredom proneness is offered. “When a person
declares herself to be prone to boredom, she is claim-
ing (i) that she frequently experiences boredom, or
(ii) that she possesses the qualities that predispose her
to experience boredom given the right circumstances”
(81; Roman numerals added). My description of bore-
dom proneness is conjunctive: both (i) and (ii) are
taken to be necessary in order for an individual to be
prone to boredom. If (ii) was a sufficient condition
for boredom proneness, then one could be said to be
prone to boredom even if one never experienced bore-
dom (e.g., one possesses the relevant characteristics
but one never finds herself in circumstances that per-
mit those characteristics to bring about the experience
of boredom). If (i) was sufficient, then accidental envi-
ronmental (or exogenous) conditions could render an
individual prone to boredom, even if the individual
possesses none of the characteristics that predispose
her to experience boredom.
something akin to a pervasive lens through
which the world is filtered. The bore-
dom prone individual often and easily
finds herself to be bored, even in situa-
tions that others, typically, find interesting
and stimulating. Furthermore, she regu-
larly becomes incapable of maintaining
sustained attention, and interest in one’s
activities (Damrad-Frye and Laird, 1989;
Eastwood et al., 2012; Malkovsky et al.,
2012), she lacks excitement for, or can find
no purpose in, what she is doing (Barbalet,
1999; Fahlman et al., 2009; van Tilburg and
Igou, 2012), and she easily becomes frus-
trated, restless, or weary by either stimuli-
poor or challenging situations (Farmer
and Sundberg, 1986). Boredom proneness
is associated with a plethora of significant
bodily, psychological, and social harms
(Vodanovich, 2003). Boredom proneness
is positively correlated with depression
and anxiety (Ahmed, 1990; Blaszczynski
et al., 1990; Sommers and Vodanovich,
2000; Goldberg et al., 2011; LePera, 2011),
anger and aggression (Gordon et al., 1997;
Rupp and Vodanovich, 1997; Dahlen et al.,
2004), a lower tendency to engage in and
enjoy thinking (Watt and Blanchard, 1994;
Seib and Vodanovich, 1998), a propensity
to make mistakes in completing common
tasks (Wallace et al., 2002), poor inter-
personal and social relationships (Leong
and Schneller, 1993;Watt and Vodanovich,
1999), lower job and life satisfaction
(Farmer and Sundberg, 1986; Kass et al.,
2001), problem gambling (Blaszczynski
et al., 1990; Mercer and Eastwood, 2010),
and drug and alcohol abuse (Lee et al.,
2007; LePera, 2011).
Boredom proneness ought to be dis-
tinguished from the state of boredom,
i.e., the actual experience of boredom
(cf. Fenichel, 1953; O’Hanlon, 1981; Neu,
1998; Fahlman et al., 2013). Even though
boredom proneness is predicated on the
antecedent experience of boredom—viz.,
one cannot be said to be prone to bore-
dom if one never experienced boredom—
the very experience of boredom does not
entail boredom proneness. One can be in
a state of boredom without one necessar-
ily being prone to boredom. Understood
as a psychological state that is not nec-
essarily the manifestation of boredom
proneness, boredom is an aversive, tran-
sient state that can be often easily alle-
viated. It can also be a rather common
and mundane experience. For instance,
most of us experience boredom while
waiting in line to pay for our shopping,
when our bus or train is delayed, or
when we have to endure the same con-
versation, lecture, or TV show over and
over again. Often, boredom is situational:
it is brought about by the unchalleng-
ing, monotonous, or repetitive situations
in which we find ourselves (O’Hanlon,
1981). As a result, boredom can be allayed
by a mere change in setting. Boredom,
however, need not always be situational.
Depending on our moods, desires, and
attitudes, situations that are ostensively
meaningful and challenging could also
bring about the state of boredom (Geiwitz,
1966; Mikulas and Vodanovich, 1993);
conversely, situations that are repetitive,
monotonous, and utterly humdrum do
not have to lead to the experience of bore-
dom (Perkins and Hill, 1985; DeChenne
and Moody, 1988).
Theoretical discussions of the state of
boredom have been predominantly one-
sided. Notwithstanding a few notable
exceptions (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 108;
Brodsky, 1995; and Russell, 1996, pp.
48, 52), the literary and philosophical
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history of boredom consists of a series
of attempts to articulate boredom’s dis-
tinctively negative nature. Boredom is
thought to be disruptive and harm-
ful (Dostoevsky, 1962, p. 418; Stendhal,
1975, p. 211; Burton, 1621/2001, p. 390;
Pessoa, 2002, p. 76; Novalis in Donehower,
2012, p. 48), a great source of unhappi-
ness and suffering (Schopenhauer, 1966,
pp. 204, 312–313, 321; Beckett, 1978;
Nisbet, 1982, p. 26; Kierkegaard, 1987,
pp. 37, 285–286; Fromm, 1990; Schachtel,
2001, p. 183) and, ultimately, a state that
hinders the development of one’s intel-
lectual, social, and even moral capacities
(Dante’s Purgatorio, XVII-XIX; Cassian,
2000; Sinkewicz, 2003; Pascal, 2004, pp.
40, 163). Boredom, as “the root of all evil,”
is a problematic state (Kierkegaard, 1987,
p. 286); it has very few, if any, redeeming
characteristics2.
Despite its impressive historical back-
ing, the view that boredom is entirely neg-
ative should be rejected. Recent empirical
work on boredom, taken in tandem with
theoretical considerations about its nature
and character, suggest a rather different
picture of the state of boredom (Barbalet,
1999; van Tilburg and Igou, 2012; Bench
and Lench, 2013; Gasper andMiddlewood,
2014). In broad strokes, the picture is as
follows: on account of its affective, voli-
tional, and cognitive aspects, boredom
motivates the pursuit of a new goal when
the current goal ceases to be satisfactory,
attractive, or meaningful to the agent.
Boredom helps to restore the perception
that one’s activities are meaningful or sig-
nificant. It acts as a regulatory state that
keeps one in line with one’s projects. In the
absence of boredom, one would remain
trapped in unfulfilling situations, and miss
out on many emotionally, cognitively, and
socially rewarding experiences. Boredom
is both a warning that we are not doing
what we want to be doing and a “push”
that motivates us to switch goals and
projects. Neither apathy, nor dislike, nor
frustration can fulfill boredom’s function
(Goldberg et al., 2011). In what follows,
I elaborate on this picture of boredom
2More recent theoretical discussions of boredom do
not diverge greatly from the practice of treating bore-
dom as a problem or malaise. See e.g., Healy (1984,
pp. 11, 75) and Svendsen (2004, pp. 16, 154) Even
Brodsky, who sets out to defend boredom, describes
boredom as an “incurable malaise” (1997, p. 104).
and make a case for its value and
significance.
But first, more needs to be said about
the very nature of the state of boredom.
In terms of its affective (or qualitative)
character, boredom is an aversive state that
is characterized by feelings of dissatisfac-
tion, restlessness, and weariness. Although
additional feelings might be present dur-
ing the state of boredom (e.g., mild frus-
tration), the aforesaid feelings are essential
to boredom. Not only subjects who expe-
rience boredom report on having these
feelings, but also, and most importantly,
the lack of any one of these feelings would
result in a psychological state that is differ-
ent than boredom (van Tilburg and Igou,
2012; Fahlman et al., 2013; cf. Thackray
et al., 1975; Hill and Perkins, 1985; Perkins
and Hill, 1985; O’Brien, 2014). Boredom
without dissatisfaction cannot be bore-
dom: to be satisfied with one’s situa-
tion is to cease to be bored with the
situation. Restlessness and weariness are
equally essential. When one is bored one is
not content with one’s situation. The state
of boredom is one from which we seek
to escape. While bored, one is thus rest-
less, for one is not content with one’s cur-
rent situation and one wishes to be doing
something else (van Tilburg and Igou,
2012). Lastly, the experience of boredom
involves weariness. To experience bore-
dom is to experience a certain kind of
weariness or mental fatigue. The boring, in
other words, tires us.
The experiential character of boredom
includes more than its affective aspects.
That is to say, boredom is not merely a sen-
sual or a qualitatively state. While bored
one has certain thoughts about one’s sit-
uation or object of attention. Often, for
example, one thinks that the situation in
which one finds oneself is bereft of sig-
nificance or meaning (van Tilburg and
Igou, 2012), or that what one is currently
doing is incongruous with one’s plans.
Furthermore, while bored one has a desire,
often quite strong, to engage in a different
and more satisfying activity. One also has
a difficulty maintaining and focusing one’s
attention (Bernstein, 1975; Fisher, 1993;
Martin et al., 2006; Eastwood et al., 2012).
One even experiences a slow passage of
time (Fenichel, 1953; O’Connor, 1967;
Hartocollis, 1972; Conrad, 1997; Martin
et al., 2006).
In a state of boredom, the world is
revealed to oneself in a particular and
indeed striking fashion (Elpidorou, forth-
coming). The world appears not only to
be uninteresting, but also distant, for-
eign, and often unyielding. Boredom con-
tributes to a loss of value, significance, or
meaning. The world of boredom is, in a
sense, not our world: it is not the world
that is in line with our projects and desires.
Our current situation does not attract us;
we do not feel compelled to engage with
it. The weariness that we experience while
bored, compounded with the perception
of a slower passage of time, makes the
character of boredom all the more aver-
sive (Sackett et al., 2010). Being in a state
of boredom feels like being emotionally
trapped: the unsatisfying situation with
which we are engaging seems to last longer;
it appears to be removed from our con-
cerns; and we feel weary. Crucially, how-
ever, boredom is not a state of equilibrium.
We are not content in it. We feel rest-
less and wish to be doing something else.
We desire escape from boredom. In turn,
while bored it is difficult for us to focus
our attention on features of the present
situation. Our mind wanders and alterna-
tive goals and situations suddenly become
salient to us. If boredom is likened to an
emotional trap, it is a trap that due to its
own character fortunately “pushes” us to
escape from it.
The significance and value of bore-
dom should now be apparent. First, bore-
dom is informative: it tells us something
both about the world and about ourselves.
While bored, our situation is disclosed to
us as unfulfilling, uninteresting, unchal-
lenging, or non-stimulating. On account
of this disclosure, boredom also informs us
of our own goals, interests, and even self-
perceived wellbeing. Being bored means
that we are currently engaged not only
in an uninteresting or unchallenging sit-
uation, but also in a situation that fails
to meet our expectations and desires.
Boredom is a state that is about ourselves
as much as it is about the world.
Second, and most importantly, the neg-
ative and aversive experience of bore-
dom acts as a force that motivates us to
pursue a goal that appears to us to be
more stimulating, interesting, challenging,
or fulfilling than the goal that we cur-
rently pursue (Barbalet, 1999; van Tilburg
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and Igou, 2012; Bench and Lench, 2013).
In an episode of boredom, our current
goal or situation is perceived as unpleas-
ant and unappealing, often as devoid of
meaning or significance; on the contrary,
alternative goals and situations are made
salient and appear to us to be attrac-
tive. Boredom thus facilitates the pursuit
of alternative goals: it “pushes” us out
of this non-stimulating, uninteresting, or
unchallenging situation and into another.
In motivating us to pursue a situation
that is different from our current one,
boredom ultimately promotes the restora-
tion of the perception that one’s activities
are meaningful and congruent with one’s
overall projects (Locke and Latham, 1990;
Sansone et al., 1992; Heine et al., 2006).
What alleviates boredom is not simply a
change of activity. Rather, what alleviates
boredom is a change from an uninterest-
ing, unfulfilling, or non-stimulating situ-
ation to one that is perceived by the agent
to be satisfactory and in line with her plans
and wishes.
Given its twofold function, boredom is
best understood as a state that monitors
and regulates our behavior. It informs us
when we are out of tune with our interests,
and, on account of its aversive character,
motivates us to engage in situations that
are perceived by us as fulfilling or mean-
ingful. Boredom is important. It promotes
our interests by trying to keep us in touch
with what we care about. It safeguards
us from emotional traps and long-term
dullness.
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